This work studies a two-candidate single-dimensional Downsian voting model with variable voter turnout. I consider a one-shot game between two candidates, where the payoffs of the candidates are their vote shares, and the strategy set of each candidate is a one-dimensional set of policy positions. The utility that a voter attributes to a candidate is linear in both the absolute distance between the candidate's policy position and the voter's preferred policy, and in the electorate's bias toward the candidate (known as the candidate's valence). I assume that the voter decides to abstain if either she is indifferent between the two candidate, or significantly dissatisfied with both candidates; otherwise, the voter votes for the candidate she prefers. I show that under any of the two assumptions about voting behavior, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists under a broad range of conditions, even if the valence of one of the candidates is nonzero. In either case, the candidates do not always choose identical policy positions. I then study how the positions of the candidates, their relative shares of vote, and turnout depend on the distribution of voter preferences and candidate valence.
1 Introduction and review of literature.
The most basic game-theoretic model of elections is a one-shot game between two candidates. Each strategy set consists of the available policy platforms that the candidates can propose. There is a set of voters with preferences over the set of policy platforms; each voter supports the candidate whose platform she likes best. The payoff of each candidate is a monotone function of the number of votes she receives. If the set of policy platforms is taken to be an interval, the preferences of each voter are single-peaked around her preferred (or ideal) policy. 1 Introducing variable turnout in this setting is difficult. Suppose we model elections as a two-stage game where at the second stage each voter decides whether to vote for her favorite candidate or to abstain. Each single vote is unlikely to be decisive if the overall number of voters is large. Thus, if there are positive costs of participating in the election (like travel expenses, time, gathering information, etc.), then the voter is likely to abstain. According to [2] , this is a very serious obstable to modeling voter and candidate behavior under the traditional assumptions of utility maximization 2 . The game-theoretic model with voters acting as rational agents (strategic voters) did not produce a conclusive argument as to why a rational person would vote in a large election ( [10] , [11] , and [12] ). This work investigates a one-stage model of elections with two candidates. Each voter is not modeled as a rational agent. Instead, she supports her favorite candidate, or abstains, subject to one of the two assumptions: indifference and alienation. Under the indifference assumptions the voter, by definition, will vote if and only if there is sufficient difference between payoffs that the candidates offer to the voter. Hence, if a voter is indifferent between the candidates, she will abstain. Under the alienation assumption the voter, by definition, will abstain if she is sufficiently dissatisfied with the policies promised by either of the candidates.
Indifference and alienation was first suggested as a possible explanation of abstention in [13] and [14] . The first work measuring the effect of indifference and alienation on turnout was [15] , who used data from a survey taken after the 1968 US Presidential election. Each respondent identified (on a 1 to 5 scale) the degree to which she liked each candidate, and whether she voted. The authors found support for the indifference but not for the alienation hypothesis. Opposite results were obtained in [16] for the 1976 US Presidential elections.
One approach to the empirical analysis of voter behavior is to assume that the utility that each voter attributes to each candidate (or party) depends in a certain way on some idiosyncratic characteristics of the voter (such as gender, ethnicity, or income), the distance between the policy program of the candidate and the preferred policy of the voter, a random element, and a set of parameters that correspond to the relative importance of policy difference and the idiosyncratic characteristics, as well as the electorate's bias toward one of the candidates. The parameters of the voter's utility function can then be estimated from survey data using the maximum likelihood method.
Using this approach, in [17] was found, for the US Presidential elections from 1976 to 2000, that the probability of a voter abstaining diminished with the difference between the payoffs that the voter attributed to the two candidates, thus providing strong evidence in favor of voter indifference . However, voter alienation was found to be significant only in the 1976 election. In [18] , support was found for both indifference and alienation abstention for the 1990 US Senate elections. Their work also included an aggregate-level model, where state-level turnout was regressed against a measure of aggregete indifference and alienation (derived from the congressional W-NOMINATE scores 3 ), and on other election-specific data, such as expected closeness of the elections. Both indifference and alienation were found to be significant. In [20] , the authors estimate a voter choice model in which one's likelihood of abstaining due to indifference or alienation depends on the individual characteristics. It was shown that both indifference and alienation were significant to the abstention rates in 1980, 1984, and 1988 US Presidential elections. The likelihood of both indifference and alienation were found to be affected by the record of voting in the previous elections, the feeling of the political efficacy and, to a lesser extent, the voter's racial background. The only work that finds little support for either indifference ot alienation is [21] , which used data from the German Bundestag elections in 1990, and found abstention to be due mostly to nonspatial factors, such as party-specific biases. However, there was some evidence in favor of indifference for one policy-specific factor -the immigration issue.
I assume that the voter decides to abstain either because she is indifferent, or she is alienated. The work is similar in spirit to the one-dimensional model in [22] , with two notable differences. First, I take the preferred policies of the voters to be nonuniformly distributed over the set of admissible policy platforms. This allows to study turnout in local Nash equilibria with voteshare-maximizing candidates. If the preferred policies of the voters are distributed uniformly, then a continuum of local Nash equilibria can exist, with different candidate vote shares and different turnout in each equilibrium. In the latter case, one can only investigate the effects of abstention on the policy distance between the candidates.
Second, I allow one of the candidate to have an advantage in terms of voter bias in her favor 4 . I show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (local and global) for voteshare-maximizing candidates exist in the general case, if one of the candidates has a valence advantage.
In a deterministic two-candidate voting model with valence and without abstention, a purestrategy equilibrium does not exist (see, for instance, [27] ). Previous studies looked at mixedstrategy equilibria, as in [28] , candidates who are not certain about the ideal policies of the voters, as in [29] , policy-motivated candidates ( [30] and [29] , see below for the definition of policy motivation). In multidimensional policy space, only a degenerate equilibrium may exist, when a candidate with the valence advantage obtains all votes, as in [27] .
Third, I analyze abstention under two assumption about the objective functions of the candidates. Under the first assumption, the utility of each candidate is the share of vote that she receives. Under the second assumption, there exists some policy that the candidate likes best (her preferred policy); at the same time, the candidate is free to propose any policy platform. Her utility depends on the distance between her preferred policy, and the policy program the winning candidate. The idea of policy-motivated candidates first appeared in [31] and [32] . I use the assumption that the probability of a candidate winning is a function of the difference between the share of votes obtained by the candidate and by her opponent. I show that in a Nash equilibrium, the preferred policies of both candidates are inside the interval between their policy platforms 5 . Finally, I consider the possibility of probabilistic voters, when the probability of a voter supporting a candidate is continuous in the policy platforms of the two candidates. I assume that the utility that a voter attributes to a candidate is equal to the electorate's bias toward the candidate minus an increasing (disutility) function of the distance between the voter's preferred policy and the candidate's policy, plus the voter's idiosyncratic bias toward the candidate. The latter component of the voter's utility function is unobserved by the candidates.
The central result in the probabilistic voting theory is the mean-voter theorem. If the idiosyncratic biases are zero-mean identically distributed continuous random variables with positive density, and the disutility function is smooth and convex, then the first-order conditions for a Nash equilibrium are satisfied when both candidates choose the policy that minimizes the sum of the disutility functions of the voters. 4 Such bias is known as the candidate's nonpolicy characteristic or valence. The notion of candidate valence is attributed to [23] and refers to candidate characteristics such as popularity, name recognition, experience, and other factors that contribute to a voter's satisfaction with the candidate regardless of that candidate's policy position. A recent approach is to analyze the implications of endogenous valence, as it was done in [24] , [25] , and [26] , and a number of other recent papers.
5 Two recent spatial voting models with policy-motivated candidates, [33] and [34] , do not investigate abstention. 6 If the disutility function is quadratic, then both candidates choose the policy that is the mean of the voter ideal policies. Probabilistic voting models were first formulated in [14] , [35] , and [36] . The mean voter equilibrium was shown to exist with several candidates in [37] and with several candidates having different valence in [38] .
Convergent equilibrium (i.e. an equilibrium in which the policy platforms of the candidates are identical) was shown to exist under a variaty of assumptions in the two recent works. In [39] , voters were strategic, and the candidates were unaware of the voter types. In a Bayesean equilibrium, the two candidates chose the same position that maximized the expected utility of the voters. Similarly, in [40] in was proven, for a set of assumptions regarding the probability of voting functions, that the convergent equilibrium is unique in a class
The equilibrium, however, may not exist due to a failure to meet the second-order conditions, or may only be a local one. For a one-dimensional two-candidate model in which the utility of a voter depends on the distance between the voter's ideal policy and the candidate's policy platform, I demonstrate that if the voters are more prone to abstain due to indifference, a convergent equilibrium becomes less likely.
The assumptions made for the probabilistic voting model are more restrictive than those in most recent literature: I assume sincere voting, one-dimentional poicy space, and voter disutility that is quadratic in the difference between the policy platform and the voter ideal policy. Under these restrictions, however, one can obtain the conditions for the existence of a global Nash equilibrium.
Model assumptions.
There is a continuum of voters with ideal policies distributed on an interval X = [v min , v max ] with a distribution function F (·).
There are 2 candidates with policy positions y 1 , y 2 . If candidate j is elected, a voter with the ideal policy v ∈ X receives the utility of
Here, y j is the policy position of Candidate j, e j is the valence of Candidate j, and φ(·) is a twice-differentiable function with φ ′ (·) > 0, φ ′′ (·) > 0 for all d > 0, and φ ′ (0) = 0. This function reflects the voter's disutility from the difference between the realized policy and the voter's preferred policy v.
7
Each model considered in this paper is characterized by three assumptions. The first assumption distinguishes between probabilistic and deterministic models.
A.1.1. Deterministic voting (DV)
. The values ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 are known to both voters and candidates.
In addition, for deterministic models we will assume that the voter ideal points are distributed with a continuous density f (·).
The alternative assumption is probabilistic voting:
A.1.2. Probabilistic voting (PV). The candidates treat the values ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 are random variables, with ǫ 1 − ǫ 2 distributed with the distribution function G(·) and density g(·).
In addition, for deterministic models we will assume that there is a finite number of voters with the ideal points
The second set of assumptions concerns how the voters choose between the candidates or abstaining. As there are only two candidates, the voters are assumed to be nonstrategig. The choice of a voter with the ideal policy v depends on the utilities u j (v) for j = 1, 2 and is denoted by the lottery t : R 2 → ∆ 3 , where t 3 denotes the probability of abstention. Under the assumption of full turnout, a voter supports a candidate who delivers the highest utility, or fairly randomizes if the utilities for the two candidates are equal.
of all mixed strategy equilibria.
7 This specification follows [35] and the majority of other works. Under an alternative specification, such as in [41] , the value ǫ ij has a multiplicative effect on voter utility.
A.2.1. Full turnout (FT)
The full turnout hypothesis is consistent with the behavior of a strategic voter whose voting costs are zero.
Under the indifference hypothesis, a voter supports a candidate only if the utility that the candidate delivers to the voter is significantly bigger than the next highest utility.
A.2.2. Abstention due to indifference (IH).
where c > 0 is a threshold common for all voters. Such voter will abstain if the difference between the utilities that she attributes to the two candidates is less than c. The indifference assumption is consistent with the behavior of a strategic voter who has voting costs of C, believes that her vote will be pivotal with the exogenous probability p = C c , and believes that when her vote is pivotal, the alternative is the election of the next-best candidate.
The final voter behavior assumption is the alienation hypothesis.
A.2.3. Abstention due to alienation (AH).
where d is the minimum utility that a preferred candidate must offer to the voter in order for the voter to turn out. The alienation hypothesis is consistent with the behavior of a rational voter who has voting costs C, believes that her vote will be pivotal with the exogenous probability p = C d
, and believes that when her vote is pivotal, the alternative is the implementation of a status quo policy which delivers zero utility to the voter.
A more conventional interpretation of the alienation hypothesis is that a voter is simply reluctant to support a candidate who delivers a low level of utility, with the psychological benefit of abstaining exceeding the possible value of being pivotal against the candidates who are even less acceptable to the voter. For one model, we combine the indifference and alienation assumptions:
A.2.4. Abstention due to alienation and indifference (AH+IH).
For one model, I assume that the probabilities of voting are uniform across voters.
A.2.5. Uniform indifference hypothesis (UI).
where η(·) is a differentiable strictly increasing function, with η(0) = 0, η(·) < 1.
The third set of assumptions deals with how the candidates' payoffs are realized. Define the expected vote share of candidate j as
There are potentially two sources of candidate motivation. The classical Downsian view is that the candidates are interested in the amount of vote that they receive. If voting is probabilistic, there are two important cases to consider. First, the candidates may be interested in maximizing the expected share of vote. Second, the candidates may be maximizing the probability of winning office. Both assumptions were extensively used in the literature and generally lead to different candidate behavior. In [42] , [43] , and [44] it was shown that in the two-candidate games, the candidate's best response functions are generally different for voteshare maximizers and probability of victory maximizers. In this work, I will consider voteshare maximizing candidates.
The probability of winning office is an increasing function of either the share of vote obtained by the candidate, or of the difference between the candidate's voteshare and the largest voteshare among the opposing candidates (the candidate's plurality). This distinction is irrelevant for a two-candidate model with perfect turnout, but may become important if the voteshares of the candidates do not add up to one 9 .
A.3.1. Voteshare-maximizing candidates (VMC). The utility of Candidate j is 8) where −j denoted the other candidate.
The parameter 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is the weight of plurality versus voteshare in determining the candidate's chances of winning.
An alternative assumption is policy motivation of candidates.
A.3.2. Policy-motivated candidates (PMC). The utility of Candidate i is
9)
9 In [14] , the probability P 1 (y 1 , y 2 , v) of a voter with policy preference v supporting candidate 1 was a continuously differentiable functions with the following properties:
A one-shot game between two plurality-maximizing candidates produced policy convergence. Crucially, their result depended on the candidate objective functions being symmetric in y 1 and y 2 . This is not the case if the candidates have different valence.
where P (·) is a twice continuously differentiable function. The valueŷ i is the ideal policy of Candidate i, y is the policy that is implemented after the elections, and ψ(·) is the disutility function of the candidate, with
The value y is the policy that the candidate expects will be realized after the elections. The function P (x) is the probability that the voter with an expected advantage of x votes will win the elections. It is assumed that P (1) = 1, P (−x) = 1 − P (x), and P (0) = 1 2 . I assume that the likelihood that a candidate will be able to implement his policy is a function of his plurality. 10 Now we are ready to describe the results of each model depending on its set of assumptions.
Overview of results
In my work, I consider local and global pure-strategy Nash equilibria in a one-shot game between two candidates, with payoffs (2.8) or (2.9), and strategy sets X. The voters are assumed to be sincere. If there are only two candidates, then sincere voting behavior is a weakly undominated strategy for the voter.
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I limit my analysis to pure-strategy equilibria. This assumption is not too restricting. For one-dimensional policy space and nonabstaining voters, [46] demonstrated that the pure strategy eqilibium where the two voteshare-maximizing candidates choose the median preferred policy is unique in the class of all mixed strategy equilibria even if the candidates cannot observe the types of the voters. Similar results for the probability of winning maximizers were obtained in [47] .
12
I first looked at deterministic, voteshare maximizing models. I derived the conditions for local Nash equilibria, and in some cases analyzed the comparative statics. In particular, we looked how the equilibrium positions of the candidates y 1 , y 2 , distance, and turnout are affected by λ, candidate valences ǫ i , as well as the cost of voting parameters c and d.
DV, IH, VMC.
In an equilibrium (if it eixts), equilibrium platforms . Hence there can be no equilibrium with 10 In [33] , probability P was considered to be zero for negative plurality, and 1 for positive plurality. They found that the two-candidate equilibrium for a multi-dimensional policy space is fragile.
11 This is not the case if there are three or more candidates, as [45] shows. 12 In [11] and [12] models with abstention, voters may adapt mixed strategies. However, this model is significantly different in two respects. First, there is a continuum of voter types (instead of only two in the aforementioned work). Second, the costs of voting are fixed across the voters and are common knowledge. Third, the utility that each voter attributes to voting for the favorite candidate is assumed to be independent of the actions of other voters. Hence, the utility of voting for the favorite candidate and the utility of abstaining (had I defined it) would have been equal only for a set of voters of measure zero. We would expect a deterministic action (either vote or abstain) from all other voters. Indeed, if ǫ > 0, then a change in y 1 has a greater effect onȳ 1 than y 2 has onȳ 2 .
Hence, for an equilibrium we must have λ > 0. Moreover, the effect of y 1 onȳ 1 must be of a different sign as the effect of y 1 onȳ 1 .
(c) ǫ = 0, λ > 0. There is a unique equilibrium for a single-peaked or a single-trough density f (·), withȳ 1 < y 1 < y 2 <ȳ 2 , and f (ȳ 1 ) = f (ȳ 2 ). The plurality parameter λ negatively affects both policy distance and turnout. The cost of voting c positively affects the policy distance y 2 − y 1 and negatively affects turnout. If ǫ = 0, the effects of a centripetal changes in y 1 and y 2 onȳ 1 ,ȳ 2 are symmetric. If so, then an equilibrium is only possible if the voter densities in the neighborhoods ofȳ 1 andȳ 2 are equal, or if λ = 0.
There is a continuum of local equilibria. The cost of voting c positively affects the policy distance y 2 − y 1 and negatively affects turnout. 
DV, AH, VMC.
The equilibrium falls into two classes, depending on the value of y 2 − y 1 (see Figure 2 ). The second case, without alienated voters between the candidates, is more interesting and yields richer results. The policy platforms of the candidates diverge in equilibrium if their valences are not equal. If the voter density in the neighborhoods of y 1 − d 1 and
, then the cost of voting does not have any effect on the equilibrium. Also, the policy distance does not depend on the plurality parameter λ and on the voter density in the neighborhood ofỹ, whileỹ itself does not depend on candidate valence. At the same time, greater valence difference should lead to more policy divergence. The rest of the comparative statics involve the sign of f ′ (ỹ). For example, the effects of λ and f (ỹ) on the positions of both candidates, as well as on the location of the indifferent voters, are of the same sign -opposite of the sign of f ′ (ỹ).
DV, AH+IH, VMC
In this case, for clarity's sake we consider the case when 
DV, UI, VMC
Under UI, a centripetal shift in a candidate's policy will have two competing effects on her voteshare. First, her voteshare relative to her opponent will increase. Second, the overall voteshare may decrease since turnout may increase with smaller policy distance.
As a result, we may or may not have policy convergence, depending on the shape of the function ψ(·). If there is no convergence in equilibrium, then a centripetal shift in the policy platform of one of the candidates will result in a decrease in turnout.
An increase in the valence advantage of the first candidate has several competing effects on the position of the indifferent voter and on the policy distance. The candidate who has the valence advantage can now obtain greater voteshare by moving her position toward that of her opponent, and will be better off given the position of her opponent. At the same time, the opponent will be better off moving away from the candidate. Thus the overall effect on the positions of the candidates is not clear. However, the effects on the position of the indifferent voter and on the policy distance are more certain, but depend on the sign of f ′ (ỹ).
DV, IH, PMC
Then we analyze the deterministic model with policy-motivated candidates. For a model with policy-motivated candidates, one of the chief relevant questions is whether the policy platforms of the candidates will be more or less extreme than their policy preferences.
Under the indifference hypothesis, we show that the equilibrium policy platforms will be more moderate.
DV, AH, PMC
For voter alienation, we show that extreme policies are possible. Suppose that y 1 < y 2 are the positions of the candidates,ȳ 1 is the location of the voter on the verge of alienation to the left ofȳ 1 , andỹ is the position of the indifferent voter. If the valence of Candidate 1 is small compared to Candidate 2, then a centripetal change in y 1 will have little effect onỹ. If the density of voters in the neighborhood ofȳ 1 is large, such a shift in policy will reduce Candidate 1's chances of winning. Hence, Candidate 1 may be disposed to choose a policy platform far to the left, maybe even to the left of her own preferred policy.
The comparative statics of Nash equilibrium for policy-motivated candidates are complicated. Instead, I opted for the analysis of candidates best-response functions. The comparative statics crucially depend on whether the candidate's policy platform is extreme or moderate relative to her preferred policy. If the policy is moderate, then higher costs of voting lead to more moderation, asȳ 1 shifts to the left and the voteshare of the candidate decreases. Less intuitively, higher density in the neighborhood ofȳ 1 and lower density in the neighborhood ofỹ whould both lead to a leftward shift in y 1 . The effect of either valence or candidate's own preferred policy on her best response is ambiguous. If the candidate's policy platform is extreme, the comparative statics are reversed. However, the effect of policy platform on policy position becomes discernible: a more moderate policy preference leads to a more moderate policy platform.
PV, IH, VMC
The final part of my work analyzes the probabilistic voting model. The convergent equilibrium is shown to be less locally stable if the cost of voting is higher. The global stability is investigated in a simplified model with only two groups of voters. Higher cost of voting and greater difference in candidate valence also reduces the global stability of the convergent equilibrium. The probabilistic voting model given alienation hypothesis is less tractable.
Model results in detail
In this section we provide the exact statemtents on the equilibrium and comparative statics in the voting models specified by the different combinations of the above assumptions. 
Deterministic voting, voteshare-maximizing candidates
Then local pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the game with payoffs given by (2.8) is as given:
1. No equilibrium exists if ǫ > 0 and λ = 0.
2. If ǫ > 0, λ > 0 and an equilibrium exists, then it must be that y 1 <ȳ 1 < y 2 <ȳ 2 and
3. If ǫ = 0 and λ > 0, an equilibrium exists only if f (ȳ 1 ) = f (ȳ 2 ), and is characterized as follows:
If one of the candidates shifts her policy position toward that of her opponent, her voteshare may change for two reasons. First, the position of the indifferent voter will change; second, the turnout will be affected. Since we assumed that voter disutility is concave in policy distance, the turnout will decrease by a greater amount if the positions of the two candidates are closer. At some point, the marginal voteshare effect of a change in a candidate's position will be zero. If the two candidates have equal valence, then the changes in the positions of the candidates will have symmetric effects on their voteshare, so an equilibrium is possible. If the valence is asymmetric, so is the effect of a candidate's position on her voteshare. Thus if y 1 is candidate 1's best response y 2 , then y 2 is not a best response to y 1 .
For one of the four cases considered above one can provide comparative statics.
Corollary 4.1 Let y 1 , y 2 be an equilibrium in Proposition 4.1. Suppose that ǫ = 0 and λ > 0. Then we have
We also have sgn(
It follows that in a local equilibrium, the marginal effect of c and λ on policy distance and turnout does not depend on the form of φ(·) or on the density f (·). The marginal effect of c and λ on the voteshares of the individual candidates depends only on the density f (·).
Example. Let φ(x) = ax 2 , ǫ 1 = ǫ 2 . Then we havē
Example. Let φ(x) = ax 2 , ǫ 1 − ǫ 2 = ǫ ≥ 0, and λ > 0. We havē
The conditions (4.12), (4.13) become
and
It follows that for small λ, the density of voters aroundȳ 1 is higher than around y 2 . The magnitude of this difference increases with c and decreases with ǫ. If f (·) is a standard normal density, then we have 21) and the candidate positions in a locally stable equilibrium become
I now consider the effects of the alienation hypothesis. Denote by
the distance between the the position of candidate i and the position of the voter who prefers candidate i to the other candidate and is on the verge of abstaining because of alienation.
The following results hold.
Proposition 4.2 Let the assumptions DV, AH, and VMC be satisfied. Then local purestrategy Nash equilibria in the game with payoffs given by (2.8) is as given:
1. 27) and
We call the voters who are on the threshold of abstaining ambivalent voters. There are potentially two cases -with and without ambivalent voters between y 1 and y 2 . Figure 2 .
Immediately, we get a consequence of the fact that the voters are risk-averse:
Since a voter with a higher valence gains more voteshare if she moves toward the indifferent voter, in an equilibrium she must also be bound to lose more voter due to alienation. We want to know how the equilibrium positions of the candidates and the position of the indifferent voter are affected by changes in the valence advantage of the first candidate, by changes in voter densities in the neighborhood of the indifferent voter and the ambivalent voters, and by cost of voting c ′ . We have to make several assumptions. First, we assume that the third derivative of the disutility function φ(·) is negative. This assumption has the following interpretation. Suppose that a voter with the ideal policy v has to choose between two options: policy y > v and a lottery where policies y − a and y + a are realized with probability 1 2 each. If the third derivative of the disutility function is negative, then the difference in utility from these two potions declines with the policy distance y − v.
The third derivative assumption is inherently consistent with the alienation hypothesis. As the distance between the candidates and the voter increases, the voter is willing to pay less in order to insure herself against a lottery on the candidate's positions, and thus is less likely to vote.
The second assumption that we make is that the voter density is constant in the neighborhood of y 1 − d 1 and y 2 + d 2 . 
Each of the following holds if and only if f ′ (ỹ) > 0:
Suppose that, in addition, we have φ ′′′ (·) < 0. Then each of the following holds if and only if ǫ 1 > ǫ 2 :
Let φ ′′′ (·) < 0 and ǫ 1 > ǫ 2 . Then the following is true if f ′ (ỹ) > 0:
Let φ ′′′ (·) < 0 and ǫ 1 > ǫ 2 . Then the following is true if f ′ (ỹ) < 0:
We find that the cost of voting C and the perceived probability of being decisive p do not affect the equilibrium positions of the candidates and of the indifferent voter. This is because of our assumption of uniform voter density in the neighborhood of the ambivalent voters. An increase in d = C p will reduce the voteshare of both candidates, but the marginal effect of a change in a candidate's position on the voteshare of the candidate will remain unaffected. For the same reason, an equal change in the valence of both candidates will not affect their policy positions, although it will change their absolute and, likely, their relative voteshares.
An increase in the valence advantage of one of the candidates will lead to a divergence of candidate positions, with the positions of both candidates moving away from the indifferent voter. This, in turn, should lead to a higher turnout.
The effect of an increase in the voter density in the neighborhood of the indifferent voter depends on an additional factor. If f ′ (ỹ) > 0, that is, the indifferent voter lies to the left of a local maximum in the density of voters, then an increase in f (ỹ) will lead to a leftward shift in the positions of both candidates and of the indifferent voter. In the new equilibrium, f (ỹ),ỹ − y 1 and y 2 −ỹ will remain the same, as we have assumed constant density around the ambivalent voters. An increase of the role of plurality in a candidate's objective function has the same effect as an increase in the voter density near the indifferent voter. When the weight of plurality increases, so does the value of capturing the indifferent voter, as the candidate not only gains votes, but also decreases the voteshare of her opponent.
Note that the policy distance y 2 − y 1 is unaffected by both the changes in f (ỹ) and λ. Thus increases of these parameters should result in an increase in turnout if and only if the left candidate has higher valence.
One can conceive a case when there are both indifferent and alienated voters. Technically, I assume that a voter will vote for her preferred candidate only if she is not qualified to abstain under either IH or AH. 
Then the following holds: 
Suppose further that φ ′′′ (·) < 0. The following holds if and only if f ′ (ȳ 1 ) > 0:
The following holds if and only if f ′ (ȳ 1 ) and ǫ − c are of the same sign: 
The first observation that one can make is that a voter with an ideal policy equal to the low-valence candidate's position is on the verge of abstaining. The positions of all voters who support that candidate are going to be more extreme.
Second, the distance between the positions of the two candidates depends only on the cost of voting c and the opponent's valence advantage ǫ, and does not depend on the distribution of voter preferences (see Figure 3) .
The turnout in this type of equilibrium is given by
The effect of the model parameters on turnout can be summarized as follows:
Corollary 4.5 The following holds if and only if
Finally, I consider the case when the voter of each type votes with a certain probability (perhaps due to different costs of voting). The probability of voting is taken to depend on the policy difference between the candidates 15 . The payoffs to the candidates are
The following equilibrium result has been obtained:
Under DV, UI, and VMC, y 1 , y 2 are a LNE if 15 This approach is similar to [22] , where the probability of voting function is defined directly and does not follow from any rational behavior. The function proposed there is consistent with both alienation and indifference hypotheses:
2v−y1+y2 , y 2 ≤ v. Here participation is a continuous function of v with lim v→−∞ P = 0, lim v→∞ P = 0, P ( y1+y2 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) = 0, and P (y 1 , y 1 , y 2 ) = P (y 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) = 1. However, this function is not used here for two reasons. First, it is appropriate only if both candidates have identical valence. Second, in order to calculate candidate voteshares one has to integrate voting probabilities over all voters to the left and to the right of the indifferent voter y1+y2 2 . Hence, voter preferences must be distributed uniformly in order for the results to be tractable.
Indifference and alienation in the deterministic model with policymotivated candidates.
For voter indifference, the following result is available.
Proposition 4.5 Let DV, IH, and PMC be satisfied, ǫ 1 = ǫ 2 , and the voters be uniformly distributed. Then, if y 1 < y 2 is a Nash equilibrium, the following must hold: .
An immediate consequence of this result is that if the candidates withŷ 1 <ŷ 2 both adapt "extreme" policy positions, then we must have y 1 > y 2 . In that case, a candidate with leftist preferences selects a rightist policy, and vise versa. Such equilibrium may be locally stable. Suppose that Candidate 1 shifts her policy to the right. There is a tradeoff, as such a move decreases her utility in the case she wins, but increases the probability of her opponent (with a more acceptable policy) winning.
This argument is rather improbable. Thus one can conclude that voter indifference is generally not sufficient to induce candidates to choose extreme policies.
Next I look at the effect of voter alienation on policy-motivated candidates. As before, a policy-motivated candidate faces a tradeoff when selecting a position closer to her opponent's. First, such a move will change the probability of that candidate (and her opponent) winning the elections. Second, it will affect the candidate's payoff in the case she wins the elections. In early literature such in [32] and [31] , full turnout was assumed, so a centripetal change in a candidate's position always increased her voteshare relative to her opponent. Hence, the sign of the second effect must be negative if candidate's position is the optimal response to the position of her opponent. Hence, a candidate will always select a policy platform that is more moderate than her own preferred policy.
This needs not be the case if voter abstention is possible. A centripetal change in the policy platform may decrease the probability of winning the elections if there is a large mass of voters who are on the verge of abstaining. In that case, the candidate may choose a position that is more extreme than her own most preferred policy. Proposition 4.6 Let PMC and AH be satisfied, with n = 1, P (x) = x+1 2
. Let y 1 be Candidate 1's best response to y 2 , with y 1 = y 2 . Then the following holds:
Barring the case whenŷ 1 > y 1 +y 2 2
and ψ(y 1 −ŷ 1 ) > ψ(y 2 −ŷ 1 ), we can expect a candidate to select an extreme policy for two reasons. First, it can happen when the density of voters in the neighborhood of the abstaining voter f (ȳ 1 ) is large enough. Second, the valence of the candidate may be much smaller than the valence of the opponent. In that case, we have φ
, so the candidate's position has little effect on the position of the indifferent voter. The voteshare effect of a centripetal change in policy platform must be negative.
The way that the model parameters affect a candidate's decision calculus depends on whether her policy platform is moderate or extreme relative to her preferred policy.
Corollary 4.7 Let y 1 (y 2 ) be the optimal response of Candidate 1. Suppose thatŷ 1 
Then the following holds:
If a candidate's policy position is moderate and her voteshare increases, ceteris paribus, then the candidate will choose a more extreme position. This happens because the amount of votes that can be gained by moderating will not change, but the probability of winning increases, raising the importance of choosing a policy close to one's best alternative. Similarly, a more moderate position will be chosen if the opponent's voteshare increases.
An increase in the voter density in the neighborhood of the indifferent voter (or a likewise decrease around the voter on the verge of abstaining) increases the gains from moderation, leading to a more moderate position.
The signs of the derivatives
require additional specification. The effect of an increase in valence is indeterminate. On one hand, a candidate with a higher valence has a greater voteshare, which allows her to choose a position closer to her preferred policy. On the other hand, higher valence means the candidate can now get more votes by choosing a more moderate policy.
The effect of a change in a candidate's preferred policy also has an ambiguous effect on the candidate's position. If a candidate's preferred policy becomes more moderate, her utility in the case she wins the elections will increase, leading her to choose a more moderate policy in order to attract more votes. However, the candidate now also has less to lose in the case her opponent wins. This may prompt the candidate to actually choose a policy that is more extreme.
Likewise, a moderation by an opponent both increases the probability of the opponent winning, and reduces the candidate's disutility in the case the opponent wins.
The second set of comparative statics corresponds to the case when a candidate selects an extreme policy platform. . Let f ′ (ỹ) ≤ 0 and f ′ (ȳ 1 ) ≤ 0. Then the following holds:
The model explored here was similar to that of in [30] , where it was assumed the candidates to maximize a weighted average of (2.8) for λ = 0 and (2). His work did include candidates with different valence, but did not consider the possibility of voters abstaining. One major difference with the earlier work is that given voter abstention, it is possible for a candidate to select a policy platform that is more extreme than her own preferred policy. Such extremist behavior is more likely if there is a large group of voters with extreme policy preferences that the candidate is afraid to lose due to abstention, or if the candidate is weak and her policy position does not have much effect on the location of the indifferent voter. 16 Extremist behavior by low-valence candidates and parties is a well-documented phenomenon, see [38] or [48] for empirical work. If the random variable ǫ 1 − ǫ 2 is continuous with unrestricted domain, then the probability that u 1 (v) = u 2 (v) is equal to zero.
Local conditions for the general form of F (·).
We first look at the probabilistic voting model under the indifference hypothesis. Without loss of generality, assume that e i1 − e i2 are identically distributed with the distribution function G(·).
The probabilities that voter i abstains or votes for one of the candidates are given by
56) The expected voteshares of the candidates are
I assume that the candidates maximize a weighted sum of plurality and voteshare:
The conditions for a convergent local Nash equilibrium in a game with are similar to those for the case of perfect turnout. Proposition 4.7 Let the utility of the candidates be given by (4.57), (4.58), and (4.59). Suppose that G(·) has a differentiable density g(·). Denote byv and σ 2 v the mean and variance of v i . Then, y 1 = y 2 =v is a local Nash equilibrium if and only if
The expected utility of the two candidates in the convergent equilibrium would be
(4.62)
The intuition of behind this result is as follows. Since the voter's disutility from policy distance is concave, the marginal effect a candidate's position on the voter's utility is increasing in policy distance. But so is the effect of a change in a candidate's position on the voter's probability of supporting that candidate -so the policy choice of each candidate is weighted in favor of more distant voters. If the disutility is linear, then these weights are linear in policy distance.
It is worth comparing the second-order conditions for this model and the case with perfect turnout. For c = 0, the condition (4.60) becomes
Thus the electoral mean is a local equilibrium if a change in a candidate's position has a significant impact on her probability of winning (high f (0), low σ 2 v ). The concavity condition is also satisfied if the density of ǫ is sufficiently close to constant. Conditions similar to (4.60) were obtained in [35] , [37] , [38] , and by a number of other works.
If there is a possibility of voter abstention due to indifference, a slightly different condition is required.
Corollary 4.9 Suppose that g(·) is symmetric around zero mean. Then the following is true.
65)
then y 1 = y 2 =v is a local equilibrium.
The equilibrium is more likely to exists if the density of ǫ is multimodal, with the voters with the realizations of ǫ at the modes of the distribution not abstaining. Thus a local equilibrium becomes less likely if c is large. Finally, the local convergent equilibrium exists if the variance of voter ideal policies is small or the candidates are plurality maximizers.
Example. Let ǫ i be uniformly distributed on [−e + a, e + a]. The value a is the expected valence advantage of Candidate 1 over Candidate 2. The voter ideal policies are distributed with meanv = 0 and variance σ 2 v . We further assume that e − a > c. This is a sufficient condition for every voter to have a positive probability of voting for every candidate if both candidates select identical policy platforms. First we investigate whether y 1 = y 2 =v = 0 is a local Nash equilibrium.
The probability that voter i will support Candidate 1 is The probability that voter i will support Candidate 2 is
(4.67)
Letting y 2 = 0, we then calculate the marginal probabilities with respect to y 1 :
It follows that if Candidate 1 maximizes her utility function, then y 1 =v = 0 is Candidate 1's locally best response to y 2 = 0. Similarly, it can be shown that y 2 = 0 is a locally best response to y 1 =v = 0. Thus, y 1 = y 2 =v = 0 is a local Nash equilibrium. The probabilities of voting for Candidates 1 and 2 in this equilibrium are
The expected utilities for both candidates will be
Global conditions for the general form of F (·).
The conditions for a global equilibrium are more difficult to obtain. Here I present an existence result for the case when there are 2 groups of voters. 2. The value ǫ i be distributed on [a − e, a + e], e − a > c, according to a nonzero differentiable density f (·).
3. For i = 1, 2, we have
for all y 1 such that |v i − y 1 | ≤ √ a + e − c and
for all y 2 such that |v i − y 2 | ≤ √ a + e + c.
Then, y 1 = 0 is Candidate 1's globally best response to y 2 = 0 if one of the following three conditions is satisfied:
Similarly, y 2 = 0 is a globally best response to y 1 = 0 if one of the following three conditions is satisfied:
(1−w) 2 − a − e and G(−c) ≥ wG(
. c < 1 − e − a and G(−c) ≥ w.
We assume λ = 0 for simplicity's sake. The condition e − a > c is sufficient for both groups of voters to have a positive probability of voting for each candidate at the convergent equilibrium. Equation (4.73) is sufficient to ensure that if the maximum of V 1 for y 2 = 0 is attained at y 1 = 0, then it is reached at the maximum of either P 11 or P 12 . Equation (4.74) is the similar condition for the maximum of V 2 .
The first inequality corresponds to the case when max y P 12 (y, 0) < 1 and max y P 11 (y, 0) < 1, second -when max y P 12 (y, 0) < 1 and max y P 22 (y, 0) = 1, third -when max y P 12 (y, 0) = max y P 11 (y, 0) = 1.
The first special case to consider is the one with a symmetric distribution of ǫ 1 . In that case, y 1 = 0 is the best response for y 2 = 0 if and only if y 2 = 0 is the best response for y 2 = 0.
Suppose that the third inequality is satisfied. In this case, Candidate 1 can deviate from y 1 = 0 to ensure that Voter 1 supports him with probability 1. Since the utility of Candidate 1 at y 1 = y 2 = 0 is decreasing in c, the equilibrium is more likely to be a global one if c is smaller. Moreover, if e < 1, then for every w there exists a c small enough such that y 1 = y 2 = 0 is a global equilibrium.
Next consider conditions 2 and 3. It follows that for every c there exists w large enough so that the voter mean is not a global equilibrium.
Example. Suppose that ǫ i are distributed as in the example above, and that there are three voters with positions v 1 = −2b, v 2 = v 3 = b for some b > 0. Let λ = 0. Denotē P 12 = max y>0 P 12 . Denote byỹ 1 the largest y 1 > 0 such that P 11 (y 1 , 0) = 0. Since the second-order condition is satisfied for y ≤ỹ 1 , V 1 (0, 0) ≥ V 1 (y, 0) for all y > 0 if and only if 2P 12 ≤ V 1 (0, 0). There are two cases.
Similar conditions for the second candidate are
2.P 12 = 1 or b 2 ≥ e + a + c. Then the condition V 2 (0, 0) ≥ 2 is e + 3c + 3a ≤ 0 that is never satisfied.
For a = 0, the sole condition for the global equilibrium is b 2 < e−c 2 .
Alienation
Under the alienation hypothesis the analysis becomes much less tractable, since for every i, the voting decision is affected by the realizations of ǫ i1 , ǫ i2 , and ǫ i1 − ǫ i2 . If the density f (·) is constant, a variant of the electoral mean is a convergent equilibrium: the candidates select the policy platform that is the mean preferred policy of the nonabstaining voters.
Let ǫ i be uniformly distributed on [−a, a]. The first-order conditions become
It follows that in a convergent equilibrium, we have
At least one such y * exists, but there can be multiple equilibria. At each such equilibrium, both candidates select the mean ideal policy of the voters who do not abstain with probability one.
Example. In order to obtain tractable second-order conditions for a model with K ≥ 2 candidates and a multi-dimensional policy space, one must assume some specific functional form for F (·). Here I use the approach of [38] and [49] . I take
Under this assumption, the probabilities of voting are given by
whereǭ K ≥ · · · ≥ǭ 1 . For y 1 = · · · = y K = 0, we must have
.
The candidates are assumed to maximize their expected voteshare. Denote ∇ by the n × n covariance matrix of v i . The main existence result is identical to that of [38] and [49] :
Proposition 4.9 In a game with candidate payoffs V j , the joint origin y 1 = · · · = y K is a local Nash equilibrium only if every eigenvalue of the characteristic matrix
is negative.
It follows that a convergent equilibrium is less likely given a higher c. A more interesting issue is the effect that voter indifference and alienation may have on the existence and location of nonconvergent equilibria. Empirical literature suggests that there is an inconsistency between measured candidate positions in multi-party elections and simulated Nash equilibria for the same elections 18 . The observed candidate positions are significantly less convergent than the predicted positions. It may be that voter indifference and alienation can account for at least some part of this difference.
Conclusion
This work formalizes a two-candidate Downsian election game where voters may choose to abstain. There are two hypotheses regarding voter's behavior. First, a voter may abstain if the difference between the candidates (from that voter's point of view) is insignificant. This assumption is known as the indifference hypothesis. Under the second, alienation hypothesis a voter abstains if the utility from the election of either candidates is below a certain threshold value. The candidates are assumed to maximize a weighted sum of absolute voteshare and plurality.
The first observation is that the equilibrium fails to exist under the first assumption, as the candidates continue to converge to the median voter. Under the second assumption, an equilibrium is likely to exist. The key observation is that the equilibrium is unaffected by small changes in the threshold utility.
The author then looks at the case when the candidates are policy-motivated. It follows that voter indifference is not sufficient to explain the existence of extreme policy platforms, while it is possible under voter alienation.
Separately, the author considers the case when the probability of voting for each voter is defined as a function of the policy distance between candidates. It was shown that in an equilibrium, the probability of voting declines with policy distance.
The hypotheses are analyzed under both deterministic and probabilistic voting. If the voting is probabilistic and the disutility of the voters is quadratic in policy distance, then the positions of the candidates can converge to the mean of the distribution of voter preferences only under the indifference assumption.
We have
whereȳ i is the voter who supports Candidate i and is on the threshold of abstaining. Thus
If λ = 0 and ǫ 1 > ǫ 2 , five cases are possible:
None of these five cases can be an equilibrium. If nǫ 1 = ǫ 2 , three cases are possible:
In the second case we have y 2 − y 1 = φ −1 (c). The second-order condition for Candidate 1 is
Likewise, the second-order condition is satisfied for Candidate 2. Now suppose that λ > 0. Letting the derivatives (5.85) and (5.84) be zero, we obtain the first-order
The second component is always positive; hence, one and only one of φ ′ (ȳ 1 − y 1 ) and φ ′ (y 2 − y 2 ) must be negative. Since ǫ 1 > ǫ 2 , it must be that y y <ȳ 2 .
Proof of Proposition 4.2
For the first case, the utilities of the candidates are
The proposition's statement contains first-and second-order conditions for the maximization of (5.88) and (5.89).
For the second case, the utilities of the candidates are
Differentiating (5.90) and (5.91) with respect to y 1 and y 2 we obtain the proposition's statement. We then check second-order conditions. Denote x 1 =ỹ − y 1 , x 2 = y 2 −ỹ.
If the second set of equilibrium conditions are satisfied, then the second derivatives are negative.
Proof of Corollary 4.3
If the equilibrium conditions (4.25), (4.26), and (4.27) are satisfied, then we have
According to the implicit function theorem, we must have
We have:
at V that is the solution to the equilibrium conditions (4.25), (4.26), (4.27) . This gives us
107)
108)
111)
112)
115) 
124)
With λ = 0, the utilities of the two candidates are equal to their voteshares:
The proposition's statement is obtained from the first-order conditions on (5.128).
Proof of Corollary 4.4
(5.129)
If the equilibrium conditions are satisfied, then we have
Evaluating (5.133), we get
137)
138)
Proof of Proposition 4.4
In the local Nash equilibrium we must have
Subtracting the two equations we obtain
We have ∂ỹ Proof of Corollary 4.6
The equilibrium conditions can be expressed as G(ỹ, x 1 , x 2 , ǫ) = 0. Put H = (ỹ, x 1 , x 2 ). (5.149)
As V i − V j = F (ȳ 1 ) + F (ȳ 2 ) − 1, the first-order conditions for each candidate are given by
φ ′ (ȳ 2 − y 1 ) + φ ′ (y 2 −ȳ 2 ) (ψ 12 −ψ 11 )−P (V 1 −V 2 )ψ 
Proof of Proposition 4.6
Suppose thatŷ 1 < y 1 < y 2 <ŷ 2 . The utilities of the candidates are given by The statements of the corollary follows from here. For the second case, the sign of the derivative ∂H ∂y1 is indeterminate.
Proof of Proposition 4.7
The first-order conditions for the maximization of the objective function are 
Proof of Proposition 4.9
The proof is nearly identical to the proof of the main theorem in Schofield (2006) . Putting The condition stated in the theorem is the second-order condition of candidate voteshare maximization at y 1 = · · · = y K = 0.
